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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
KEVIN R. GRONAU, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20000278-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State of Utah appeals from the District Court Order granting the defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. As a result of the Order granting the Motion to Suppress the charge 
of Possession of Marijuana in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, a 
Second Degree Felony, was subsequently dismissed. This Court's jurisdiction is 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Title 77-18a-l(2)(a)(1999) and Title 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the State's only point of appeal fails to address the issue of whether 
or not there was reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify 
a second encounter with the defendant and whether their appeal should 
therefore be dismissed. It appears the standard of review should be one of a 
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2. presumption of the validity of the lower court ruling similar to those cases 
where an adequate record is not perfected. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64. 
3. Whether there was a sufficient show of authority to justify the trial courts 
ruling that the second encounter was a Level II encounter, and that the 
subsequent seizure was therefore unconstitutional. The standard of review 
would be for correctness. State v. Davis, 965, P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution Art. I Sec. 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged with possession of Marijuana with intent to distribute 
in the presence of a minor, a Second Degree Felony (R.2). The defendant moved to 
suppress the State's evidence that was obtained as a result of a search of the defendant's 
vehicle. On August 27th, 1998 the trial court granted the Motion to Suppress (See 
2 
Addendum A of the State's Appellate Brief). The case was dismissed on March 23, 2000 
and the State appealed (R.86). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 16, 1998 at approximately 9:00 A.M. the defendant was pulled over 
on Interstate 1-15 at mile post 219 by Trooper Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway 
Patrol. The defendant was stopped for traveling 80 miles per hour in a 75 mile per hour 
posted zone. (PH pages 6 & 7) (SH 5 & 6). 
During the stop there was conversation about a hole punched in the defendant's 
drivers license (SH 7-9), but it was determined before the defendant left in his car that the 
license was valid. (SH 9-20). There was also discussion about the Hertz rental car the 
defendant was driving was one day overdue, based on the return date on the contract. (SH 
10-3). 
The defendant was driving north towards Salt Lake City when he was stopped. 
Mr. Gronau told the officer he had been to St. George to drop his nephew off and was 
returning. (SH 8-22) 
Officer Mangelson testified at the Suppression Hearing that: "He told me that he 
had never been arrested, never been in any trouble." (SH 8-21). The actual conversation 
concerning prior arrests was recorded on video and the video is a part of the court record. 
At (9:12 A.M. approximately) on the video. On the video officer Mangelson never asked 
the defendant if he had ever been arrested. Officer Mangelson said "Have you ever been 
in any trouble?" To which the defendant replied "No. I'm not a troublemaker." (See 
Video at (9: 12 A.M.). The defendant did at that time acknowledge he got a traffic ticket 
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about 3 years before. The defendant did not tell the officer he had been arrested on a 
drug charge in 1991. 
Officer Mangelson did not observe any marijuana or contraband in the vehicle. 
(PH- 21-11) and released the defendant and his vehicle. Concerning the release the 
officer testified in the Suppression Hearing starting on Page 10 Line 15, as follows: 
"Q. When you said that, were you limiting what he could do, 
or was he free to do what ever he wanted to do. 
A. He was free to do whatever he wanted to do. I simply told 
Him, if it come back that he had a criminal history, that I would 
contact him. And he needed to use the restroom, and so obviously-
Q. Why would you have contacted him if he had a criminal history? 
A. That would have told me that he was lying to me about his criminal 
History; and depending upon what that criminal history was for, that I 
wanted to go a little bit further. 
Q. And why was that? 
A. Well, say, for example, it he had a criminal history for auto theft, 
it could certainly be one step closer to the fact that he may have stolen 
this vehicle. If it was for drugs, then there's a good chance he may be 
transporting drugs." 
Starting on Page 12, line 1 of the Suppression transcript, the testimony continued 
as follows: 
"Q. You felt like that if the criminal history came back with something 
on it that you would have reasonable suspicion to detain him further? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And possibly receive a consent to search? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you didn't feel like you had enough to detain him at this point? 
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A T really didi: I at ilia! jH>MII 
(Jtlh.:-M '.;= v- " eauested a records check (SH 9-20) in atvimoi, 
license check but the records check did not come hack i ill .il'ter the defendant had been. 
released. 
Officer Mangeison then followed the dcicuda:.: - •**'•* •-nil the defendant 
pulled off at exit 111, Mang<,.r^ . n remained on the freeway and watched the defendant 
ii il 'IH; dispatcher notified Mangeison that the defendant had a drug arrest in I '><> 1, At 
that point Mangeison pulled mio ilk JUI kiitjj", k.l he hind the defendant at a 90 degree 
an^ic •<:.*. AC defendant gelson informed the defendant 1 
arrest and iotc ihe defendant that Mangeison suspected the defendant was transportinu 
drugs, l he deleiiduiil refused ID allow a search of the vehicle and Trooper Mange.-A-: 
informed the defendant that he was going to call u \ . *:•*•* •• JO around :he 
car. At this point which was prior to the dog being called in the officer testified that 
v '"<* -nih the defendant was free to leave, that the car was n« • - - nud not 
have been allowed to get into llu • ai mut Ii w r il awav. The facts set forth in this 
jMFa^ i<?p'- -• ^ate - 'p the (Suppression Hearing Transcript Page 
through Page 15 line . nese pages are reproduced herein as "Addendum 
A" 
S U M M A K •* '-Ul\i 
I I In- ruline of the trial coui'i »~5 ii:at the second encounter siuaid n^\^ , i 
been made because nothing happened between the In M en^^mer and the second 
encounter that would give reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the second 
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encounter. The State in its brief did not even address the issue of the impact of the 
dispatcher's message of a 1991 arrest. 
2. The State argues in its brief that there was no seizure prior to the dog sniff of 
the car and that the uncommunicated intentions of the officer are irrelevant. Defendant 
contends that there was an illegal Level II stop and as a part of that stop there was a 
substantial show of authority by the officer and a communicated statement that he was 
going to call for the dog to sniff the car. Therefore the car was not free to be driven 
away by the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE, IN ITS APPELLATE BRIEF, HAS FAILED TO 
EVEN ADDRESS THE BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
IN THE SUPPRESSION ORDER. 
Point 1 in the State's brief argues two issues, both of which relate to the factual 
matters involved after the second encounter between the officer and the defendant. The 
basis of the Trial Court's actual ruling was set forth very explicitly in the last two 
paragraphs of the "Ruling" portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Although the 
entire decision is reproduced in the Addendum to the Appellant' brief, the critical portion 
that we rely on for this argument is reproduced as follows, but with emphasis added: 
"Officer Mangelson claims that he had a reasonable suspicion to seize the 
vehicle because Gronau lied to him about his previous criminal history. 
However, the facts, including the video, show that Officer Mangelson asked 
Mr. Gronau, 'Have you ever been in any trouble.' To which the defendant 
replied, 'No. I'm not a troublemaker.' Assuming, arguendo, that Gronau 
did lie about his criminal history, i.e. a drug arrest in 1991 and a traffic ticket 
in 1995, this does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Therefore, Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity to justify the second encounter with Gronau or to seize his personal 
property. 
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Due to the fact that Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable, 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the vehicle was wrongfully seized and 
the subsequent search pursuant to the Search Warrant was unconstitutional. 
Therefore, all evidence discovered during the search must be suppressed." 
I\>r purpose of this appeal the defendant does not conieinl ilui ills' initial stop for 
speeding 8u w. nt> was in anyway ilk^ji M;. (ironau was tin en a. warning ticket and 
* »-• -Her some degree of questioning. As apart <»i ;!JU. question-ML: • » ' 
Mangelson asked Mr. Gronau, ( a man over 40 \vi\r\ of a ' **v - ery generic question 
"Have yon evei hvn \\\ uwiihlu. \ The defendant contends that no reasonable person 
would be expected to sit on the side of a highway and umles.. .ill nf his sins of 40 plus 
years * >n the oi:ie. • \ savini? "No I'm -;ot a rn able maker/' does not 
give rise to an articulable reasonable suspicion oi'cr.nui,: . * iistifv an 
additional encounter 
In light of the fact that the State has failed to even address me , CJ 
granted the Motion to Suppress, the States appeal should be dismissed 
POINT II 
THE SECOND ENCOUNTER WAS A LJL V JLJL JLI kS < W N T E R 
AND REQUIRED A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 
As previously detailed in the Statement of
 : , ' . ive'-^ :^v»e Mr. 
Gronau a warning ticket at the first encounter and allow ec him to rroceeu ui.u . he 
n»-:nv:r y - •* doing so acknowledged he did not . . . - J ..;J...• j .vinin him any 
further -'':.,,„ .ingi/U-n, iln U |..'.I.I from the dispatch that Mr. (rronau 'Kid i Arjq 
-" > a iyyi.
 Anis was the sole basis of the second encount- ' • • : : ^un 
followed the defendant up tiic /a^i * = ic defendant go\ off at the Neotu exit 
the oflkoi ' .it on lhe ! ' - - piam viev o: * ie defendant and watclK^ :nr.\ 
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called the officer. The officer then pulled into the restaurant parking lot at a 90 Degree 
angle behind the defendants car. He confronted the defendant and told him about the 
1991 arrest. The officer also told the defendant he suspected the defendant was 
transporting drugs and wanted to search Mr. Gronau's car. Mr. Gronau told him no. 
The officer also testified that at that point he did not have enough to detain Mr. 
Gronau but that the car could not go. 
The State argues that because the officer did not specifically tell Mr. Gronau that 
the car was "In Jail" that his uncommunicated intent was not a seizure. 
The factual situation in this case is very similar to Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 
274, (2000). In that case Ray was effectively seized because the officers were retaining 
her papers. Although she may have been allowed to walk away and leave her papers 
behind she did not have to do that. In this case the State is saying Mr. Gronau could have 
got in his car and driven away because the officer did not say to Mr. Gronau that the car 
was seized. The standard as recognized by this Court and a set forth in Salt Lake City v. 
Ray, (supra at 277) as follows: 
"Hence, a level one encounter becomes a level two stop and a 'seizure 
under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable person, in view 
of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave." 
As set out above and in the Statement of Fact there was a substantial show of 
authority by the officer which the State ignores in its brief. There is one other factor the 
state ignores which is absolutely critical. When Gronau said no to the search the officer 
said "Well, what I am going to do is I am going to call Alden Orme, a Nephi City dog 
handler and I will have him run his dog around the car." (Addemdum A Transcript Page 
14 line 23) The State cannot reasonably contend the defendant was free get in his car and 
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leave when the officer informed the defendant that the dot", Imrullei was going to be called 
to have the car sniffed 1 hi 'Wli'.vr'' inimnons were very well, set forth, in Addendum, A, 
at pagt: Ir^ line 6 through 11 where he said the defendant could x\.. J • , i 
because he was going to get a search vvaiuul, This dialog involved the officers intentions 
t <JI. i - "ii called. 
( OIN< U ' M O N 
it is rt'spci • (it(iicslc(j that this court hold that the Trial, court was correct in 
suppressing the evidence on the grounds that the c\ :• i. - • • >r - ai 
search in v*.-.:;:.. . i -• • J . .i to the U. S. Constitution, and .Article I Sec, 
14 \ Jtah Constitution . 
RESPECTF . \ \< ? : ! ^ d;:v of December, 2000 
H:DON SHARP, ATTTOB&JEY FOR APPELLEE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee by first class 
Mail, on this 13th day of December, 2000, to: 
Scott Keith Wilson 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 So., 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDA 
1Z 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
ii LIIL. jriminal history 
came b--j'- •• li something or: *" that you • 
reasonable suspicion, to 'I --: i -i i 11 h i m further? 
A. Y^i , 
1i a v e 
Q. And poss ib I y 
A . Y P -I . 
i v- a consent t o search? 
:k" you had enough t-n 
W JL. ** 
But you diu , ; '"j\ , 
detain I.M.I ,I Lhis point? 
A, I really di : 
* u let li i m go ? 
«;, i -J 
. L would have happened ha a i. u i aken the 
Nephl exit and continue • . IP freeway into Dtib 
Couiiz , - ' an Sal t ha ke Count v ? 
1 5 
1 6 
1 v i 
1 a 
i :* 
2 0 
I p r o b a i / e f o l l o w e d h i m f o r a 
w a y s . O U & i± 
U JL JL -
*~
 TA7 ^ 1 
w o u l d h a v e t o l 1 
i V O U i u 
" C 
m a a e 
i m a 1 1 t h e 
m e i a C K 
o t h e r e f f o r t t o 
a K e n : h e e x ^ 
c a p p e r 
He t- ii i^  e o n 
•w I I J- 111 
a v ^ , ^ ^ U1 : e r : n a n 
-14 
2 ' , 
e x i L 
l"i i" e e w a v w h e r e i c 
* O i i L. -
.e „ . a d e 
TTt 
. c u r e s 
1 e f r. t u in i n t n t h P C I i , i i "i ; and rather 
than
 fiii i i 
of iL re 3 
or some In 
DUIled 
-I i ' h " fronc, he wenr. around the north bi-Je 
slow, looked like n.- < . i • i i nq tor somebody 
4 ff
 P *•- h e n went around the back ? f Circle C , 
And then the next l, i lm w a s a s h e 
i r r , , t J t iuui t h e s o u t h s i j " J h i l e h e w a s 
o n t h e s o u t h s i d e , h e w a s o u t , u l m i « b u t a s s o o n a s 
h e com-L. i i i h< ' I >I o l l h e b u i L d i n g t h e n r ^ o u l d s e e 
h i m a g a i n a n d -i • r I . T ^ p o i n t riu [ i i •  i i n ' i h e f r o n t , 
a n d ii'i -JII I J J IL w e n t i n t o t h e b u s i n e s s He w a s i n 
t h e r e a s h o r t L i ri< 
u i i i u uxA^ H-. s o a t z :: e r c a m e b a ^ k a n d 
i;;( J v e m, e t h e i n f o r m a : ; : ^ ^ ^ *• ^ & 
Q. 
A . 
h a d a -j J 
1 9 9 4 . 
Q . 
t h a t ? 
A . 
A . 
c a r , a n d 
I i 1 j l r « i MI . 
0 • 
r o i : i s L i t .. li 
T h e i n r o r . u . » l d U u l 1 fj .i.-l 
j| , , M 
. I JL J7 ^ J- w * . * * . ^ ~ " 1 1 . 1 J 
ti,l thai: lead you to do anything after 
r-^ C* f ' 
i - f- V, a r\ 
1
 h e **r cr... ' 
5 b e u v* **c i d 
G o i n g w e s t ? 
U t a h D i s t r i c t CKJ U I I ,-, 
A. Going west and pulled into the south side of 
Milkelson's Cafe . 
Q. Where is that in Nephi City? 
A. Yes. 
As he stepped out of the vehicle, I pulled in 
on about a 90-degree angle to the way his car was 
parked, and I confronted him with the information that I 
had gotten back from dispatch. 
Q. What did you say to him? 
A. I told him that dispatch had advised me that 
he had a drug arrest in 1991; and I told him what my 
suspicions were, that I suspected that he was 
transporting narcotics. 
Q. And what did he say? 
A. He got very hostile and told me that I was 
harassing him and that type of thing. 
And I said, "Well, do you mind if I check 
your car? " 
And he said, "No, you are not going to search 
my car." He said, "Me and my boy is going in and have 
breakfast. You can do whatever you want, but you are 
not going to search my car." 
And I said, "Well, what I am going to do is I 
am going to call Alden Orme, a Nephi City dog handler; 
and I will have him run his dog around the car." 
Utah District Courts 
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And he said, "Do whatever you want. We're 
going in for breakfast." 
Q. Was the defendant free to leave at this 
point ? 
A. He was. 
Q. Had he gotten in his car and traveled down 
the freeway, would you have detained him further? 
A. Well, when I say the defendant is free to go, 
I'm not saying that his car was free to go. I was going 
to obtain a search warrant for the car, and eventually 
that's what I did. 
Q. But was the defendant free to go? 
A. He was free to go, yes. 
Q. And what happened after you had this exchange 
with him? 
A. He and his son went in the cafe. I don't 
know what they did. I assume they got some breakfast. 
They was in there for 25, 30 minutes. I had the dog 
handler come out, and he ran the dog around the car, and 
the dog alerted on the trunk area of the car. He 
scratched the paint off the rear bumper. 
MR. SHARP: I'm going to object to him 
testifying as to his conclusions concerning the dog. 
The dog handler is apparently here and --
THE COURT: He can testify to what he 
TTf-ab District Courts 
